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of the coach’s dynamic personality on
the field. Cameron makes the point that
“[i]f Ken Niumatalolo is your neighbor,
you think he’s a great guy. But if you
play football for Navy, in an instant, he
can be your worst nightmare” (p. 107).
Cameron does a superb job recounting
the intense rivalries that Navy has with
not only Army and Air Force but Notre
Dame. He describes the 2007 win over
Notre Dame—after forty-three consecutive losses—as follows: “The night ‘the
Streak’ died—the longest streak in
NCAA history—eighty thousand fans at
Notre Dame Stadium watched in stunned
silence as Navy let go of forty-three years
of misery, embarrassment, and frustration” (p. 136). He details the joy—and
other emotions—of football games with
Army and Air Force, with the overall
winner receiving the Commander in
Chief ’s Trophy. Few other writers can
match Cameron’s insights into and appreciation of the distinctive qualities of
the Army-Navy game. “The annual bit of
military theater, greater than any other
game, makes the Army-Navy legacy a little sweeter. The nation’s game” (p. 106).
Nonetheless, I struggled somewhat
with the book. I found it difficult that
Cameron seems to be telling two stories,
in that as he writes about the chronology of Navy football he intersperses
the story of Navy’s fierce rivalries with
Army, Air Force, and Notre Dame.
At times the story was challenging to
follow because I was reading about
things from two different perspectives:
one that portrayed a chronology, and
another that recounted memorable
games with Navy’s leading rivals.
The appendices highlighting Navy’s
unforgettable games, unforgettable
seasons, GOATS (read the book), players, coaches, and a potpourri of other
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topics all add value and make this book
a must-read for football fans across the
country. Cameron has shined a spotlight
on Navy’s football program through its
highs and lows, with colorful commentary that makes it an enjoyable read.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS

The Battleship Holiday: The Naval Treaties and
Capital Ship Design, by Robert C. Stern. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 272 pages.
$42.95.

Robert Stern, a writer of more than
twenty books on naval matters over
three decades, opens his latest effort by
admitting that he is tackling a subject on
which much has been written already.
The Battleship Holiday explores the
history and technical design of capital
ships that the five signatories to the
1922 Five-Power Treaty—Great Britain,
the United States, Japan, France, and
Italy—plus Germany built during and
after the “battleship holiday” that the
treaty imposed. His fresh approach
to analyzing capital ship design and
construction during this period
addresses the ships and their innovations chronologically rather than along
national lines. Throughout this chronology, he explores three major threads:
diplomacy, technology, and operational
performance. Stern offers that, while
other treatments address one or two of
these threads, his assessment of all three
provides “more complete insight into
the interplay of factors that led different
nations to build different ships” (p. 10)
to achieve their respective national goals.
Divided into two parts, the book first
explores how capital ships evolved to the
point at which the world’s naval powers
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decided to limit them. Beginning with
the 1862 battle of Hampton Roads, Stern
traces the evolution of capital ships
up to the 1916 battle of Jutland. His
threads run through ship design and
construction as each nation emphasized
characteristics important to its vision
of the battleship’s role. Stern steers
clear of analyzing strategy and tactics
except where necessary to show how
different technical decisions combined
with tactical developments, such as to
produce Jutland’s outcome. The chapter
“The Art and Practice of Main-Battery
Fire Control in 1916” demonstrates
Stern’s in-depth analysis of technological
advancements by the various belligerents. In addition to gunnery and
fire control, each country drew from
Jutland different lessons on armor,
propulsion, and machinery—many of
them incorrect. Stern concludes the
first section by describing the tension
between liberal politicians and naval
leaders as they attempted to curtail the
exorbitant cost of maintaining a fleet
of modern battleships. The resulting
Washington Naval Treaty system placed
specific restrictions on capital ships. The
subsequent battleship building holiday
succeeded in preventing unconstrained
shipbuilding, but it did not inhibit
ambitions to build better battleships.
The second half of the book tracks
capital ship design and construction
from 1922 to 1946. The idea of naval
disarmament began to fray less than five
years after its initiation, slowly at first
and later accelerating to the point of dissolution. During the intervening years,
naval architects fought to design ships
that maximized war-fighting capability
within the treaty’s 35,000-ton restriction.
Stern spends significant time discussing
the technical details of various designs,
including the sacrifices, benefits, and
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political ramifications involved. He gives
equal coverage to all the navies building
capital ships, including their decisions
on whether to follow the constraints the
Washington Treaty system imposed. He
also includes significant discussion of
ships not built, and why. The chronological approach demonstrates how the
different design decisions responded to
or ignored the efforts of other nations.
Stern’s assessment culminates with an
analysis of the effectiveness of these
battleships’ offensive and defensive
capabilities in combat. Direct comparison is nearly impossible, since only
three engagements occurred that pitted
new-generation battleships against each
other. The German battleships Bismarck
and Scharnhorst succumbed to their
peers HMS Prince of Wales and HMS
Duke of York, respectively, in battle at
sea, but those actions included other
vessels or aircraft that prevented a “fair
fight.” The other direct action between
new-generation battleships consisted of
USS Massachusetts (BB 59) battering the
incomplete French battle cruiser Jean
Bart, holed up in Casablanca’s harbor.
Stern assesses other surface actions, including the battleship duel in which the
post-Jutland battleships USS Washington
(BB 56) and USS Alabama (BB 57) sank
the Japanese pretreaty battle cruiser
Kirishima, and the cornering and scuttling of the German Graf Spee by British
cruisers at the Río de la Plata. In almost
every case, whether they resulted in
sinking or survival, battleship-protection
schemes underperformed. Surface action
was no longer the norm—the majority
of battleship damage and losses in the
Second World War resulted from air
attack, especially with aerial torpedoes.
Stern provides a fresh and highly
technical assessment of the pinnacle
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of naval warship design. But in doing
so he demonstrates the futility of this
construction. Bent on applying the
lessons of Jutland to ensure victory in
the next great naval battle, nations built
the ultimate dreadnoughts, only to see
them relegated to convoy protection and
antiaircraft duty, untested in the fleet
actions for which they were designed.
While America, Britain, France, and
Italy continued to operate battleships
after the Second World War, the design
and construction costs of battleships
proved exorbitant in relation to their
utility in the era of the aircraft carrier.
JAMES P. MCGRATH

Turkey and the West: Fault Lines in a Troubled
Alliance, by Kemal Kirişci. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 2018. 309 pages. $34.

Turkey’s oscillation between the West
and East is nothing new, nor is there
a lack of literature on the topic. But
what Kemal Kirişci accomplishes in
his most recent work is an insightful
analysis of Turkey’s history and its
foreign policy by-products through the
lens of the current security quandary.
Most valuably, the book demonstrates
the interaction among the various
currents within Turkey and how they are
creating an increasingly anti-Western
foreign policy. Given the author’s goal
of elucidating Turkey’s history up to the
present day and reducing the confusion
about what is behind its government’s
decision-making, his book offers the
most authoritative work available.
Not long ago the United States was
touting Turkey as a model for countries
seeking to join the international liberal
order, in particular for those trying to
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reconcile Islam and democracy. Early in
his tenure Recep Erdoğan gave a speech
at Harvard in which he quoted Thomas
Jefferson, praised democracy, and
extolled the virtues of Turkey’s eventual
European Union (EU) accession. As recent as 2011, Erdoğan delivered a speech
in Cairo that emphasized democracy
and secularism as qualities intrinsic to
Turkey. Yes, things can change in a hurry
in the Middle East, but why and how
did the esteem in which Turkey was held
around the world recede so quickly?
The author provides an engaging
picture of all the factors at play, many of
which are rooted in domestic politics.
He traces Turkey’s history since World
War II, focusing particularly on the
period since the Gezi Park protests in
2013. Turkey has banned consumption
of alcohol in public spaces, altered
the content of educational materials
in schools to align them more with
Islam, curtailed personal freedoms, and
detained journalists. Nowadays Erdoğan
makes public comments demeaning the
founder of the modern Turkish republic,
Kemal Atatürk. Erdoğan is deploying
an increasingly majoritarian form
of democracy that excludes the 48.6
percent of the country that did not vote
for his increased power in the April 2017
referendum. The situation in Turkey
portends a mutually reinforcing nexus
in which growing authoritarianism
within the country’s borders moves in
parallel with a foreign policy increasingly at odds with that of the West.
In analyzing the international factors at
play in Turkey’s shift, Kirişci gives due
attention to the war in Syria and the
migration crisis. But in addition to these
better-known fault lines, what the author
does exceptionally well is to explain how
Europe and the United States are not
without blame for fostering skepticism
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